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This Focused Review expands upon our original paper (You can’t kid a kidder": Interaction
between production and detection of deception in an interactive deception task. Frontiers
in Human Neuroscience, 6:87). In that paper we introduced a new socially interactive,
laboratory-based task, the Deceptive Interaction Task (DeceIT), and used it to measure
individuals’ ability to lie, their ability to detect the lies of others, and potential individual
difference measures contributing to these abilities. We showed that the two skills were
correlated; better liars made better lie detectors (a “deception general” ability) and this
ability seemed to be independent of cognitive (IQ) and emotional (EQ) intelligence. Here,
following the Focused Review format, we outline the method and results of the original
paper and comment more on the value of lab-based experimental studies of deception,
which have attracted criticism in recent years. While acknowledging that experimental
paradigms may fail to recreate the full complexity and potential seriousness of real-world
deceptive behavior, we suggest that lab-based deception paradigms can offer valuable
insight into ecologically-valid deceptive behavior. The use of the DeceIT procedure
enabled deception to be studied in an interactive setting, with motivated participants,
and importantly allowed the study of both the liar and the lie detector within the same
deceptive interaction. It is our thesis that by addressing deception more holistically—
by bringing the liar into the “spotlight” which is typically trained exclusively on the lie
detector—we may further enhance our understanding of deception.
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INTRODUCTION
Besides being a topic of enduring fascination to
laymen, deception has stimulated a vibrant field
of scientific enquiry across numerous distinct
research disciplines including (but by no means
limited to) philosophy, psychology, economics,
criminology, and in recent years, neuroscience.
Despite this long, inter-disciplinary tradition,
doubt appears to exist as to the possible future
direction of deception research. This doubt has
largely been due to discussions of the utility (or
futility) of laboratory-based deception research
(Vrij and Granhag, 2012).What follows is a brief
general introduction to the field, highlighting
key findings and an overview of the methods
employed to uncover them. We hope that this
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will lead to an understanding of the context
within which the original research (Wright et al.,
2012) was formulated.
Our original paper aimed to address some of
these methodological criticisms of laboratory-
based research, but most significantly, to focus
on the skill of the liar in addition to the lie
detector. A new, socially interactive, task was
developed in which participants were motivated
by competition and high-value prizes. Results
were analyzed using the novel application of
signal detection theory to measure lie produc-
Signal detection theory
An analysis technique traditionally
used in psychophysics whereby the
sensitivity (d′) and bias (C) of a
Receiver are independently estimated.
Outlined in the current paper is an
approach designed to apply this
technique to Sender performance
offering similar benefits.
tion ability, alongside the ability to detect lies.
The main goal of the research was to assess
whether skill in the production and detection
of lies were correlated, that is, to assess whether
good lie detectors made good liars. The results
and implications of the research, most notably
the description of a “deception-general” abil-
ity contributing to both production and detec-
“Deception-general” ability
Refers to the recent finding that the
abilities to detect and to produce
deception successfully may be related.
IQ and measures of self- and
other-focused emotional intelligence
are not correlated with this
deception-general ability, further
research is required to understand the
contributing psychological or cognitive
processes involved.
Veracity effect
The finding that when considered
separately, truthful statements are more
usually correctly classified as such than
lies correctly identified as lies.
Potentially a statistical artefact due to
the Truth Bias.
Truth bias
A common response bias in lie
detection tasks whereby Receivers will
tend to make more “Truth” ratings
than would be expected by chance.
Usually lie detection experiments use
an equal amount of truthful and
deceptive stimuli, thus participants
typically judge more than half of all
stimuli as truthful.
tion of deception, are presented and it shall be
argued that laboratory-based studies of decep-
tion are not only valid, but constitute an area
ripe for theoretical development (see also Frank
and Svetieva, 2012).
Deception is a ubiquitous aspect of everyday
human interaction and remarkably varied in the
forms it can take, the contexts in which it can
occur and the motives ascribed to its perpetra-
tors (DePaulo et al., 1996; Kashy and DePaulo,
1996). Any taxonomy of deceptive human inter-
action will necessarily include such diverse con-
cepts as white lies, bluffing, lies of omission,
malingering and even sarcasm (Levine, 2010). A
commonly used definition of deception, which
attempts to incorporate all forms of decep-
tion, is “a successful or unsuccessful deliber-
ate attempt, without forewarning, to create in
another a belief which the communicator con-
siders to be untrue” (Vrij, 2000, p. 15). In spite of
this common starting point, the ways in which
deception is operationalized in the laboratory
setting are still hugely varied, and almost univer-
sally problematic in some regard. It is important
to note however, that central to this depiction
of deception is the inherent interpersonal or
social component; there is a deceiver and the
deceived—the liar and the lie detector.
DETECTING DECEPTION
Whether explicitly or not, the majority of decep-
tion research has focused on lie detection.
Studies have examined individual differences in
lie detection ability, factors that may predict
the ability of an individual to detect deception,
and strategies, cues or technologies designed to
improve lie detection (Vrij and Granhag, 2012).
From lie detection studies such as these a num-
ber of robust results have been observed. For
detailed analysis, interested readers are directed
toward three comprehensive meta-analyses by
DePaulo et al. (2003); Bond and DePaulo (2006,
2008).
The first of these meta-analyses (DePaulo
et al., 2003) examined a range of 158 cues for
their predictive utility to discriminate honest
and deceptive behavior. Although several cues
were found to be predictive of deception (such
as response duration and vocal pitch), each was
only very loosely related to deception across
studies such as to be of almost no use in detect-
ing deception given large variance in the expres-
sion of those cues within an individual, even
when telling the truth, and the large degree of
variance in the extent to which the cues are dis-
played across individuals (Levine et al., 2005).
The second meta-analysis (Bond and DePaulo,
2006) focused on the accuracy of lie detection
(based on a corpus of nearly 24,500 veracity
judgments), and found mean “lie detection”
performance to be in the region of 54% accu-
racy, with most studies falling within 10% of
this figure (Levine, 2010). Although not much
higher than may be expected by chance, this
rate is nonetheless significantly different from
chance. The 54% accuracy referred to above is
the percentage of all statements judged which
are correctly identified as truth or lie. When
examined separately, accuracy at correctly iden-
tifying truths is generally higher (approximately
65%) than the rate at which lies are correctly
identified as lies (approximately 40%). This
“Veracity Effect,” is often attributed to a com-
monly reported response bias observed in naïve
lie detectors, the so-called “Truth Bias.” The
design of the majority of lie detection tasks
usually involves 50% of stimulus items being
truthful and 50% deceptive. It is observed that
individuals usually identify more statements as
truthful than as deceptive (around 60–65%),
and therefore this response bias could account
for the increased accuracy for truthful state-
ments over deceptive ones. The inadequacies
of these blunt percentage accuracy figures are
discussed and a potential solution proposed in
a later section describing our Signal Detection
Theory analytic framework.
That no universal deception cue has yet
been identified is perhaps the most broadly
reported result in the literature. Similarly robust
is the finding that no single individual differ-
ence measure is reliably related to deception
detection accuracy when individuals perform
deception detection tasks (Aamodt and Custer,
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2006). The failure on behalf of behavioral psy-
chology to identify reliable correlates of lying
has prompted the application of neuroscience
techniques such as electroencephalography and
functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI)
in an attempt to identify a neurological sig-
nal of lying. Debate surrounding the accuracy
and utility of these techniques has been fierce,
but several studies have provided promising evi-
dence for the identification of deceptive patterns
of brain activity using fMRI (e.g. Hakun et al.,
2009; Monteleone et al., 2009), although coun-
termeasures can be developed which may render
the technique useless in practice (Ganis et al.,
2011).
THE IMPORTANCE OF THE LIAR
An interesting feature of the empirical literature
on lie detection is that the selection of stimu-
lus material is usually only briefly described in
journal articles and examples are rarely pub-
lished. The apparent assumption is that lies are
invariant in quality and all lies will necessarily
display some “deceptive evidence” that an accu-
rate judge will be able to perceive and correctly
attribute to attempted deception. In contrast to
this view, a meta-analysis by Bond and DePaulo
(2008) suggests that the outcome of any individ-
ual deceptive engagement between liar and lie
detector may be more attributable to the skill
(or lack thereof) of the liar than any acuity on
the part of the lie detector. In spite of these data,
only a small minority of studies has made any
attempt to determine individual differences in
the ability to lie (and tell the truth) credibly
(e.g., DePaulo and Rosenthal, 1979; Riggio et al.,
1987). Thus, a focus on the liar constituted one
of the main aims of our original study.
WHAT’S WRONGWITH STUDYING LYING IN THE
LAB?
A debate rages around the ecological validity
of studying deception in the lab, with some
researchers arguing that lab studies are impos-
sible to generalize to applied contexts and so
therefore contribute little to our understand-
ing of real-world deception. Criticism usu-
ally include 5 specific features of deception
paradigms, including (1) the use of instructed
lies, (2) the sanction of experimental lies, (3)
low motivation experienced by participants, (4)
low stakes for failure, and (5) limited social
interaction.
Instructed lies
Participants recruited to act as liars or truth
tellers are usually instructed to either lie or tell
the truth upon experimental cues. The fact that
an experimenter instructs the participant to lie
or tell the truth is argued by some to remove
the essence of deception by not giving the per-
petrator the option to lie or tell the truth—that
instead of lying, participants are merely fol-
lowing instructions (e.g., Kanwisher, 2009). Of
course this feature of deception paradigms is
not intrinsic to deception itself, and therefore
experimental paradigms can, and have been,
developed which remove instruction and allow
participants to choose when to lie (e.g., Sip
et al., 2010, 2012). The use of uninstructed
paradigms introduces further problems how-
ever; including lower rate of lies produced in
such situations which impacts upon statistical
power and experimental control. Furthermore,
allowing participants to choose when to lie is
likely to introduce an experimental confound
relating to confidence or strength of opinion. It
is possible that participants may only choose to
tell lies about issues that they can confidently lie
about. These issues are likely to be those things
that matter least to them, or issues for which
they already have well-rehearsed lies. It has been
argued that removing the choice about whether
to lie means that the experimental study lacks
ecological validity (Kanwisher, 2009), but we
suggest that it is not always the case that in real-
life we can choose when to lie and when to tell
the truth. There may be many occasions where
prior behavior, job or family roles, or social
or moral imperatives demand deception even
though the individual may not want to lie, or be
confident about successfully doing so.
Sanctioned lies, low motivation, and low fear of
failure
That lies are sanctioned in experimental set-
tings, thereby removing the element of moral
transgression, associated risk of punishment,
and possible related feelings of guilt, anxiety and
cognitive load (Caso et al., 2005) is a common
criticism leveled at deception paradigms (Frank
and Ekman, 1997). It is argued that removing
the threat of punishment, which would nor-
mally accompany being uncovered as a liar, lim-
its the availability of verbal and behavioral cues
elicited by lying, in particular those cues relat-
ing to arousal and cognitive effort. In turn, it is
argued that the absence of these cues contributes
to the exceedingly poor rates of deception detec-
tion in experimental paradigms. Experimental
evidence does not support this conjecture how-
ever; Feeley (1996) found no difference in the
accuracy of judgments made by recipients of
either sanctioned or unsanctioned lies, while
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Feeley and de Turck (1998) showed evidence
that sanctioned lies were more commonly asso-
ciated with behavioral cues to deception than
unsanctioned lies. This result was recently repli-
cated in our lab. Indeed, Sporer and Schwandt
(2007) performed a meta-analysis of 11 studies
and the only “deceptive cue” which differed as
a result of sanction was smiling, in that smiles
tended to increase when lies were unsanctioned.
Motivation
A related issue concerns the motivation to lie.
It has often been argued that the low level of
motivation to succeed when lying, and low fear
of failure, mean that experimental studies of
deception lack ecological validity. This argu-
ment is presented in two different ways—one
version of the argument suggests that as the
stakes for success or failure in the lab are much
reduced compared to real life (as a result of sanc-
tioned lies for example), participants may not
try as hard to effect successful deceit. Conversely,
it is also argued that real-life deception may
be less successful than in the lab because the
greater motivation to successfully deceive in real
life (due to the higher stakes for success and
failure) may lead to a difficulty in effecting
successful deception, a so-called “Motivational
Impairment Effect” (DePaulo and Kirkendol,
1989). In response to both of these criticisms
we would question the assumption that all
instances of deception in everyday life are of
sufficient importance to cause high motivation.
Sender
The communicator of a message. In
deception detection paradigms this
constitutes the liar (or truth teller).
Although Senders are by necessity part
of experimental tasks, their
performance is rarely reported. Such
performance is argued to be critical to
the outcome of a deceptive encounter.
Receivers
In deception detection tasks, the
individual tasked with making the
judgment will often be referred to as
the Receiver. Historically, this has been
the focus of interest in deception
research, be it individual differences in
accuracy, predictors of accuracy, or
methods of training improved
performance.
Indeed, observational studies suggest that most
lies in everyday life are unplanned, of minimal
importance and of little consequence if detected
(DePaulo et al., 1996; Kashy and DePaulo,
1996). Although some researchers have argued
previously that only high stakes (such as a crim-
inal conviction) may be suitable for ecological
examinations of deception, a greater awareness
of the range of lies told in everyday life has led
to a softening of this view (Vrij and Granhag,
2012).
Social interaction
In our view more worrisome than the factors
discussed so far is the lack of social interaction
in experimental studies of deception. Although
deception is an inherently dynamic social inter-
action (Buller and Burgoon, 1996), only 9% of
studies in a meta analysis by Bond and DePaulo
(2006) featured any real interaction between the
Sender of lies and the individuals tasked with
their detection (Receivers). Stimulus material
in lie detection tasks is usually pre-recorded
(in written, video, or audio form), thus per-
mitting limited access to potentially useful cues
to deception not portrayed by these media. It
is worth highlighting that without a live audi-
ence, the performance of the Sender may also be
impacted since a video camera gives no feedback
or sense of social contingency. In this regard,
researchers examining investigative interview
strategies have maintained an important aspect
of everyday deception by virtue of using socially
interactive paradigms (e.g. Hartwig et al., 2006).
Interestingly, neuroscientists such as Sip and
colleagues have frequently argued for the need
for a social dimension to deception research
and have implemented this within their fMRI
designs investigating deception (Sip et al., 2010,
2012).
Thus, with the goal of focusing upon the liar
and addressing the most theoretically relevant
individual difference measure with regards to
lie detection accuracy—the ability to deceive—
we developed a paradigm addressing a number
of the criticisms aimed at previous laboratory
studies. Primarily, we hoped to address the lack
of social interaction and the low motivation
of participants using an interactive competitive
game played for high value cash prizes. While
participants were instructed whether to lie or to
tell the truth on each trial, lies were directed to
other participants who stood to lose if they did
not detect the deception. Therefore the recip-
ient of the lie did not sanction the lies. As
detailed in the original article, we hypothesized
the existence of a “deception-general ability”
whereby the ability to deceive and the ability to
detect deception may be related, with cognitive
(Spence et al., 2004) and emotional intelligence
(Sip et al., 2010) contributing to both processes.
Although this review focuses on the findings
from the first iteration of this novel Deceptive
Interactive Task (DeceIT), the key finding of a
deception-general ability has since been repli-
cated by our group (Wright et al., submitted)
and awaits examination in other labs.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Fifty one healthy adults (27 female, mean age
= 25.35 years, SD = 8.54) with English as a
first language participated in the study. All
participants provided written informed con-
sent to participate and for data to be collected.
The local Research Ethics Committee (Dept.
of Psychological Sciences, Birkbeck College)
granted ethical approval for the study.
PROCEDURE
Participants volunteered to take part in a
“Communication Skills” experiment and were
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randomly assigned to nine groups of five partic-
ipants and one group of six participants, with
the constraint that group members were not
previously known to each other. Participants
were seated in a circle and asked to com-
plete an “Opinion Survey” questionnaire. The
questionnaire comprised 10 opinion statements
(e.g., “Smoking should be banned in all pub-
lic places”) to which participants responded
“agree” or “disagree.” Responses to the Opinion
Survey served as ground truth in the subsequent
task (c.f. Mehrabian, 1971; Frank and Ekman,
2004). Participants also completed the Toronto
Alexithymia Scale (TAS—Parker et al., 2001),
a measure of the degree to which emotions
can be identified and described in the self, and
the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI—Davis,
1980), a measure of empathy. These instru-
ments provide self- and other-focused mea-
sures of emotional intelligence (Mayer et al.,
1999; Parker et al., 2001). A subset of partici-
pants (n = 31, 61% of sample) also completed
the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence
(WAIS—Wechsler, 1999).
Participants were then informed that they
were to participate in a competitive “game”
against the other participants in their group
that was designed to test their communication
skills. They were told that two high value (£50)
prizes would be awarded; one to the participant
who was rated as most credible across all tri-
als and the other to the participant who was
most accurate in their judgments across all tri-
als. Participants were required to make both
truthful and dishonest statements relating to
their answers on the prior “Opinion Survey,”
with the objective being to appear as credible as
possible regardless of whether they were telling
a lie or the truth. Participants played the role
of both “Communicator” (Sender) and “Judge”
(Receiver), and their role changed randomly on
a trial-by-trial basis, with topic being similarly
randomized.
On each trial, the experimenter presented
one participant with a cue card, facedown, spec-
ifying a topic from the “Opinion Survey” and an
instruction to lie or tell the truth on that trial.
This indicated to all participants the Sender for
the upcoming trial. At a verbal instruction to
“go,” the participant turned the card, read the
instruction, and then spoke for approximately
20 s, presenting either their true or false opin-
ion and some supporting argument. After the
presentation of the format of the task, a prac-
tice trial was conducted for all participants and
the experimenter presented a verbatim exam-
ple response from the piloting phase of the
study. This permitted each participant to fully
preview the requirements of both Sender and
Receiver roles. Following each trial, Senders
were required to rate whether they thought they
had been successful or unsuccessful in appearing
credible using a binary “credible” or “not cred-
ible” response scale. Simultaneously, Receivers
rated whether they thought the opinion given by
the Sender was true or false by marking “Truth”
or “Lie” on their response form. Each partici-
pant completed 10 or 20 trials as Sender, half
with their true opinion and half with their false
opinion. Statistical analysis demonstrated that
performance did not vary as a function of the
number of statements produced and so this vari-
able is not analyzed further. The 50:50 lie-truth
ratio was not highlighted to the participants
at any stage to prevent strategic responding in
either the Sender or Receiver roles. Following
the task, participants were asked to rate the
degree to which they experienced guilt, anxiety
and cognitive load when lying and when telling
the truth, each on a 5-point Likert scale ranging
from 1 (not at all) to 5 (extremely).
ANALYZING DECEPTION DETECTION DATA USING
SIGNAL DETECTION THEORY
In deception detection experiments, researchers
often wish to measure two aspects of perfor-
mance: (1) the ability of receivers to discrim-
inate lies from truths, and (2) the receiver’s
tendency to classify messages as true (truth
bias). (1) Is typically measured as the percentage
of messages that are correctly classified by the
receiver (lies classified as lies and truths classi-
fied as truths). Greater than chance performance
(i.e., performance that is greater than would be
expected if based upon guessing) is therefore
indicated by a percentage correct score greater
than 50%. (2) Is most commonly indexed as the
percentage of truth classifications made (across
all messages); scores greater than 50% therefore
indicate a general truth bias. One limitation of
measuring (1) using the percentage correct mea-
sure is that, when the proportions of lie and
truth messages are unequal, this measure is not
independent of (2). For example, suppose that a
receiver has a general tendency to classify mes-
sages as truths. If a greater proportion of true
messages than false messages are presented to
the receiver, then the receiver will most likely
score above 50% when the percentage of cor-
rect classification score is calculated, but this
will be a false impression of their detection abil-
ity: their accuracy is confounded by their truth
bias. This limitation of the use of the percent-
age correct measure in deception research has
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been noted by other researchers (e.g., Bond and
DePaulo, 2006). Thus, the use of the percentage
correct measure is typically confined to circum-
stances in which there are an equal proportion
of truth and lie messages, or a weighted ver-
sion of the percentage correct measure is used
when the proportion of lie and truth messages
are unequal.
Signal detection theory is a well-established
framework (Green and Swets, 1966), which
can be used to provide alternative measures
of detection discriminability and truth bias.
Importantly, measures can be derived that are
not confounded, and can be used when there
are unequal proportions of lie and truth mes-
sages to be classified. In place of the percentage
of correct classifications and the percentage of
truth classifications, the signal detection mea-
sures of d′ andC can be used, respectively. Using
this framework, a “hit” (H) can be defined as a
“lie” classification to a lie message, and a “false
alarm” (FA) can be defined as a “lie” classifica-
tion to a truth message. d′ can then be calculated
as the difference in the z transformed propor-
tions of hits and false alarms (i.e., d′ = z(p(H))
– z(p(FA)). A positive d′ score therefore indi-
cates a tendency to correctly distinguish lies
from truths. The measure of bias, C, can be cal-
culated as C = −0.5 × [z(p(H)) + z(p(FA))]. A
negative value of C therefore indicates a truth
bias, and a positive value of C indicates a bias to
classify messages as lies.
Demeanor Bias
Characteristics that contribute to the
extent to which an individual Sender
may be believed (or not) due to general
appearance or communicative style.
THE ANALYSIS OF DECEPTION PRODUCTION DATA
USING SIGNAL DETECTION THEORY
Wright et al. (2012) showed that signal-
detection measures could also be effectively
applied to index the deceptive abilities of the
Senders of truth and lie messages. Similar ben-
efits arise from the use of independent mea-
sures of d′ and C in the Sender role as these
index Discriminability (or the extent to which
a Senders’ lies and truth messages can be cor-
rectly distinguished) and Credibility (the extent
to which a Senders’ messages as a whole tend
to be rated as truthful), respectively. Sender
Credibility, as indexed by C may be thought to
be analogous with the “Demeanor Bias” men-
tioned previously. Full details of the analysis
strategy and the interpretation of results can
be found in Wright et al. (2012) and Wright
et al. (submitted). An overview of the applica-
tion of SDT to deception research is provided
in Figure 1. A major advantage of characterizing
the performance of Receivers and Senders with
the same measures (d′ and C) for each role was
that it facilitated an analysis of the relationship
between the measures across roles.
RESULTS
In line with previous studies (Caso et al., 2005)
participants reported greater Guilt, Anxiety and
Cognitive Load when lying than when telling the
truth [statistics: Guilt t(50) = 7.060, p < 0.001,
d = 1.226, Anxiety t(50) = 9.598, p < 0.001,
d = 1.784, Cognitive Load t(50) = 9.177, p <
0.001, d = 1.421]. Also in common with pre-
vious studies (Walczyk et al., 2003), Response
Latency was significantly shorter when partici-
pants told the truth [M = 4.6 s, SD = 2.0) than
when they lied (M = 6.5 s, SD = 3.1, t(50) =
−3.885, p < 0.001, d = 0.728]. Finally, task
performance in the Receiver role was analyzed
using conventional percentage accuracy rates
FIGURE 1 | An overview of the application of Signal Detection Theory (SDT) to the Sender role and its
interpretation.
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and overall accuracy was found to be 54.1%
(SD = 8.7%), not significantly different to the
54% reported previously (Levine, 2010) [t(50) =
0.065, p = 0.950, d = 0.013] but significantly
greater than chance [t(50) = 3.335, p = 0.002,
d = 0.667]. Fractional rates addressing accuracy
for different types of statement showed a sig-
nificantly lower mean accuracy for truths (M =
51.1%, SD = 11.9%) than for lies [M = 57.1%,
SD = 10.5%, t(50) = −3.731, p < 0.001, d =
0.746]. To compare any response bias in the
Receiver role with findings from the literature,
we calculated the number of statements of all
types classified by Receivers as truthful and
found it to be 46.7% (SD = 8.8%) a figure sig-
nificantly lower than chance [t(50) = −2.667,
p = 0.005, d = 0.535].
Large individual differences were observed
in all of the four performance measures
analyzed using Signal Detection Theory (M
d′receiver = 0.242, SD = 0.418; M Creceiver =−0.086, SD = 0.233; M d′sender = 0.272, SD =
0.509; M Csender = 0.097, SD = 0.256). Of
principal interest is the fact that detectabil-
ity in the Sender role (d′sender) and the ability
to discriminate in the Receiver role (d′receiver)
were significantly correlated (r = −0.348, p =
0.006, d = 0.742, see Figure 2). As the ability to
discriminate truthful from deceptive messages
increased, the ability to produce deceptive mes-
sages that were hard to discriminate from truth-
ful messages increased. Interestingly, a trend
was observed for decreasing detectability in the
Sender role to be associated with a reduced
response latency difference between truthful
and deceptive statements (Spearman’s rho =
0.259, p = 0.068, post-hoc). The only significant
association with either measure of bias (Truth-
Bias or Credibility) was a correlation between
a Sender’s confidence that they were believed
and their Credibility measure, i.e., those that
FIGURE 2 | Correlation between Sender and
Receiver performance using SDT measures for
Receiver Accuracy (d ′receiver) and Sender
Detectability (d ′sender) (r = −0.348, p = 0.006,
d = 0.742).
judged they were believed were more likely to
be seen as honest independently of the veracity
of their statements (Spearman’s rho = −0.316,
p = 0.024, post-hoc). Neither IQ (all r values <
0.184), emotional ability relating to the self (all
r values < 0.198), nor empathy (all r values <
0.153) correlated with d′receiver, Creceiver, d
′
sender,
or Csender .
DISCUSSION
The relationship between the abilities to
successfully produce and accurately detect
deception was examined using a novel group
Sender/Receiver deception task (DeceIT). This
paradigm addressed widespread concerns
around ecological validity in that it was socially
interactive (rather than video-mediated) and
sought to increase and maintain motivation
in participants by introducing a competitive
element with high-valuemonetary rewards. The
reported results were comparable to patterns
of results reported in the deception literature
with regards to increased self-reported guilt,
anxiety and cognitive load while performing
the task (Caso et al., 2005), as well as the overall
percentage detection accuracy rate (Levine,
2010). Furthermore, chronometric cues related
to deception were replicated, whereby signifi-
cantly longer response latencies were recorded
for statements in which participants lied than
when they told the truth about their opinion
(Walczyk et al., 2005). The finding that the
ability of individuals to detect deception and to
successfully deceive were positively associated,
is interpreted to suggest the existence of some
form of “deception-general” ability, contribut-
ing to success in both roles within a deceptive
encounter.
Interpreting the “deception-general” ability
given the data currently available is very dif-
ficult. Deceptive skill was unrelated to IQ or
self-report measures of self- or other-focused
emotional intelligence. We tentatively suggest
that it may be a product of practice or vigi-
lance in everyday life through social learning
(Cheney et al., 1986; Byrne, 1996) or attention
to conspecifics more generally (Heyes, 2012).
Speculatively, this practice may enable the indi-
vidual to develop a model, likely to be implicit
in nature, that they can apply in a deceptive
encounter to either modulate their own behav-
ior or to assess the behavior of another. Whether
individual difference variables such as social
motivation, social attention, or theory of mind
contributes to the speed with which one devel-
ops a model of deceptive behavior, and therefore
a deception-general ability, is at present an
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unanswered question. Gaining a comprehensive
understanding of how people differ in their abil-
ity and propensity to deceive is an important
research aim, and a present focus of our lab.
To summarize, our recent discovery of a
“deception-general” ability, conferring advan-
tage to some individuals over others in both
aspects of deception, is a potentially power-
ful interpersonal tool delivering a competitive
edge for resources and social position. We have
argued that our DeceIT paradigm and Signal
Detection Theory based analytic technique pro-
vide the tools to finally turn the spotlight on the
liar, a variable of interest in deception research
whose time was long overdue. We have shown
that DeceIT addresses a number of the method-
ological concerns around sanction, low stakes
and social interaction highlighted above. We
have further suggested that lab-based research
is not distinct from the vast majority of real-
world deception in terms of the penalty for
being caught lying, we cite evidence describing
real-world lies as being frequent and often of
little consequence if discovered (DePaulo et al.,
1996; Kashy and DePaulo, 1996).
We have promoted the adoption of SDT tech-
niques in future research to index the perfor-
mance of both Senders and Receivers, of liars
and lie detectors. Although the SDT measures
initially seem less transparent than traditional
percentage accuracy scores, they capture all
aspects of performance relevant for deception.
One can gain independent measures of an indi-
vidual’s skill when deceiving, their credibility
or demeanor bias, their ability to detect lies,
and their degree of credulity, or truth bias.
These measures are confounded in traditional
percentage accuracy scores. Furthermore, per-
centage accuracy scores, but not SDT measures,
are susceptible to biases induced through factors
such as the proportion of lies and truths pre-
sented to participants during the experimental
task.
Certain researchers, deeply ensconced in the
field, may appear somewhat frustrated or urge
a wholesale change of direction in deception
research. However, in keeping with the idea that
it is often “darkest before the dawn,” we pro-
mote a renewed vigor in deception research,
both in the lab and within applied settings. An
important element of this drive must be the
broadening of research goals beyond that of
lie detection, to include lie production ability,
and the mechanisms of credibility and trustwor-
thiness that contribute to it, leveraging all the
tools, insights and theoretical advancement that
interdisciplinary collaboration promises.
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